@vygruppen/spor-mcp-server
MCP server for Spor Design System
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Routine maintainer cleanup; no new unknown maintainer added, publisher has existing track record on this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Internal design system tooling; lack of provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@sanity/client | AI (phantom-deps): @sanity/client is a declared runtime dependency used in config; phantom-dep false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.6 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.1.3 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.1.2 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.1.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 2 |
v2.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.