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@walkeros/destination-demo

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Demo destination for walkerOS - logs events to console

38
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

alexanderkirtzel

Keywords

walkerOSdestinationdemo

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance missing-githead AI (provenance): Established publisher with strong track record; missing gitHead is a minor CI environment change, not a malware signal for this package. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA attestation; consistent with monorepo automation for elbwalker/walkerOS. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Established walkerOS org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk indicator here. ai

Versions (showing 38 of 38)

Version Deps Published
4.1.2 1 / 0
4.1.1 1 / 0
4.1.0 1 / 0
4.0.2 1 / 0
4.0.1 1 / 0
4.0.0 1 / 0
3.4.2 1 / 0
3.4.1 1 / 0
3.4.0 1 / 0
3.3.1 1 / 0
3.3.0 1 / 0
3.2.0 1 / 0
3.1.1 1 / 0
3.1.0 1 / 0
3.0.2 1 / 0
3.0.1 1 / 0
3.0.0 1 / 0
2.1.0 1 / 0
2.0.0 1 / 0
1.0.5 1 / 0
1.0.4 1 / 0
1.0.3 1 / 0
1.0.2 1 / 0
1.0.1 1 / 0
1.0.0 1 / 0
0.8.0 1 / 0
0.6.1 1 / 0
0.6.0 1 / 0
0.5.0 1 / 0
0.4.2 1 / 0
0.4.1 1 / 0
0.4.0 1 / 0
0.3.5 1 / 0
0.3.4 1 / 0
0.3.3 1 / 0
0.3.2 1 / 0
0.3.1 1 / 0
0.3.0 1 / 0

v4.1.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.1.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: alexanderkirtzel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v4.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v4.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.4.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.4.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.3.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.1.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v1.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.8.0

2 findings
HIGH Missing gitHead — previous versions had it provenance

This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: alexanderkirtzel.

INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.6.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.5.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.4.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.3.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.4

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.3.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.3.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.