@walkeros/web-destination-hotjar
Hotjar web destination for walkerOS (session replay, heatmaps, surveys)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation is a legitimate CI/CD migration for this org. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@hotjar/browser | AI (dependencies): Official Hotjar browser SDK; expected runtime dep for a Hotjar destination package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): walkerOS monorepo packages consistently lack provenance; not a risk indicator for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.3.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.3.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.2.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.2.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.1.2 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.1.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 1 |
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (alexanderkirtzel) on 2026-05-21, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.