@walkeros/web-destination-mixpanel
Mixpanel web destination for walkerOS (events, people, groups, consent)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance; this is the documented release pipeline for the elbwalker/walkerOS monorepo. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/index.browser.js | AI (source-diff): Encoded strings are standard minified bundle output; samples show normal module boilerplate, not obfuscated payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/index.es5.js | AI (source-diff): Same as browser bundle — ES5 transpilation polyfills, not malicious encoding. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Stable false positive for this package; no provenance is common and no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 4.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 4.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 2 |
v4.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.1.0
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.