@walkeros/web-destination-plausible
Plausible web destination for walkerOS
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop consistent with monorepo refactor extracting shared code into @walkeros/core dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-wide CI/CD adoption. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @walkeros/core is a first-party monorepo package from the same org/version; not a suspicious third-party dep. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/dev.js | AI (source-diff): Network calls are Plausible analytics API calls; dynamic code execution is standard module pattern from bundler output. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/dev.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same as CJS variant; legitimate analytics destination bundle. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dev.js | AI (source-diff): tsup-minified bundle; content is Zod + walkerOS destination code, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/dev.mjs | AI (source-diff): Same tsup-minified ESM bundle; legitimate build artifact. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established walkerOS monorepo package; provenance not configured but no other risk signals present. | ai |
Versions (showing 42 of 42)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.3.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.2.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.1.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.1.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 4.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 4.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.1.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.6 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 0 |
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.