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@walkeros/web-destination-segment

Segment CDP web destination for walkerOS (@segment/analytics-next, full Segment Spec)

11
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

alexanderkirtzel

Keywords

walkerOSwalkerOS-destinationdestinationwebsegmentanalytics-nextcdpcustomer-data-platform

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected for a monorepo with SLSA provenance; stable pattern for this package. ai
publish-pattern new-deps-added AI (publish-pattern): @walkeros/core is a first-party sibling package in the same elbwalker/walkerOS monorepo; not a suspicious third-party dep. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@segment/analytics-next AI (dependencies): Official Segment analytics library; expected and documented dependency for this Segment destination package. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Consistent across all walkerOS packages; not a malware signal for this org. ai

Versions (showing 11 of 11)

Version Deps Published
4.1.2 3 / 1
4.1.1 3 / 1
4.1.0 3 / 1
4.0.2 2 / 1
4.0.1 2 / 1
4.0.0 2 / 1
3.4.2 2 / 1
3.4.1 2 / 1
3.4.0 2 / 1
3.3.1 2 / 1
3.3.0 2 / 1

v4.1.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.1.1

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: alexanderkirtzel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v4.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v4.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v4.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.4.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.4.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.4.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.3.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.