@wangnov/ccsp-linux-x64
ccsp prebuilt binary for Linux x64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Intentional prebuilt binary distribution for a platform-specific CLI package; covered by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 0 |
v4.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • bin/ccsp
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.