@wangnov/ccsp-macos-arm64
ccsp prebuilt binary for macOS arm64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific prebuilt binary package by design; SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD build integrity. | ai |
Versions (showing 13 of 13)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 4.0.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.3 | 0 / 0 |
v3.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (wangnov) on 2026-03-26, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.