@weapp-vite/miniprogram-automator
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/launch-CDd9gHVW.mjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled build output with readable source regions; not obfuscated. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/launch-F4arniwI.mjs | AI (source-diff): File is readable bundled ESM output, not obfuscated; long lines are from bundled source regions. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is the initial placeholder release in a monorepo; publisher has clean track record and legitimate repo. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/launch-Didv0lMX.mjs | AI (source-diff): File is rollup-bundled ESM with readable identifiers and region comments; not obfuscated. Pattern is stable for this build tooling package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/launch-Bd3TZy1I.mjs | AI (source-diff): Large bundled ESM output from tsdown; readable source regions visible, not actual obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is published via CI with Sigstore SLSA attestation; stable positive signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 3 / 1 |
v1.1.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.