@webex/internal-plugin-feature
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Long-lived Webex SDK monorepo package; empty description is a consistent pattern across its packages, not a malware signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Webex SDK publishes via CI (webex-jenkins) without Sigstore attestation; stable pattern across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.12.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.11.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.10.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.9.0 | 3 / 14 | |
| 3.8.1 | 3 / 14 |
v3.11.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.