@webex/test-helper-appid
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decodes WEBEX_APPID_SECRET env var for JWT signing — standard auth pattern, not obfuscation. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.12.0 | 7 / 11 | |
| 3.11.0 | 7 / 11 | |
| 3.10.0 | 7 / 11 | |
| 3.9.0 | 7 / 11 | |
| 3.8.1 | 7 / 11 |
v3.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.