@webitel/api-services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation is a legitimate and more secure publishing pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:msw | AI (phantom-deps): msw is a mock service worker library; plausible dev/test dep in an API services package, no install scripts. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:qs-esm | AI (phantom-deps): qs-esm is a query-string utility; plausible runtime dep for API services, no install scripts. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lodash-es | AI (phantom-deps): lodash-es is a standard utility library; plausible dep, no install scripts. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@faker-js/faker | AI (phantom-deps): faker is a test data library; plausible for mock/test support in API services, no install scripts. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all 143 versions of this package; low risk given publisher track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.40 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.39 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.38 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.37 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.36 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.35 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.32 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.1.28 | 4 / 17 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 17 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 17 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 16 |
v0.1.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.36
5 findingsDeclared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Declared in package.json dependencies but never imported in source code. Phantom dependencies may exist solely to execute install scripts or inject transitive malicious code. This was the exact attack vector in the axios compromise (plain-crypto-js).
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.