@webpieces/ai-hook-rules
Pluggable write-time validation framework for AI coding agents (@webpieces/ai-hook-rules). Claude Code PreToolUse + openclaw before_tool_call adapters share one rule engine.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | rapid-publish | AI (publish-pattern): CI/CD automated publishing via GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance; rapid successive publishes are expected. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from deanwebpieces to GitHub Actions is backed by SLSA/Sigstore attestation; legitimate CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall conditionally loads a local compiled file; no network access or arbitrary code execution. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require resolves a statically known local path (src/bin/postinstall.js); not user-controlled input. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.134 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.127 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.126 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.122 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.121 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.120 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.119 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.118 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.117 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.116 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.115 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.114 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.2.113 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 0 |
v0.3.134
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.127
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall.js
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.126
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.122
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.121
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.120
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.119
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.118
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.117
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.116
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.115
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.114
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.113
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.