@wendellhu/redi
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:redis | AI (typosquat): redi is a DI library in a scoped namespace; name similarity to redis is coincidental. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:redux | AI (typosquat): redi is a DI library in a scoped namespace; name similarity to redux is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.0.1 | 0 / 22 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 22 |
v1.1.1
2 findingsPackage name '@wendellhu/redi' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'redis'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsPackage name '@wendellhu/redi' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'redis'.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.