@williamthorsen/release-kit
Version-bumping and changelog-generation toolkit for release workflows
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@williamthorsen/node-monorepo-core | AI (dependencies): First-party scoped dep from the same author/monorepo; consistent across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Package is published via GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; publisher-changed is expected for this automated workflow. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; no other risk signals present to elevate this. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@williamthorsen/nmr-core | AI (dependencies): Same-author first-party dependency; consistent namespace and repo org reduce risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.3.1 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.3.0 | 7 / 3 | |
| 5.2.1 | 6 / 3 | |
| 5.2.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 5.1.0 | 6 / 3 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 4.7.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 4.6.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 4.5.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 4.5.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 4.4.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 2.3.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 2.3.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 2.3.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 0 |
v5.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.