@window-splitter/react
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@window-splitter/state | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package from the same publisher; version-locked to match this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@window-splitter/interface | AI (dependencies): Sibling monorepo package from the same publisher; version-locked to match this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.3 | 3 / 24 | |
| 1.1.2 | 3 / 24 | |
| 1.1.1 | 3 / 24 | |
| 1.1.0 | 3 / 24 |
v1.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.