@wix/astro-backoffice-extensions
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal Wix monorepo package; missing metadata is expected for scoped internal tooling. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal Wix package; missing description is consistent with monorepo tooling pattern. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.4.2 | 1 / 11 | |
| 2.4.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 2.4.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.3.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 8 |
v2.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.