@wix/auto_sdk_automations_activations
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Wix auto-generated SDK packages intentionally lack descriptions/repo URLs; mass-production pattern is expected for this publisher. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable false positive for Wix auto-generated SDK packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 111)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.26 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.25 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.24 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.23 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.22 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.21 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.20 | 2 / 1 |
v1.0.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.