@wix/headless-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): @wix monorepo packages commonly publish at 0.0.0 as internal stubs; not a malware indicator here. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal @wix utility package; missing description is a style issue, not a risk signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata is consistent with a private @wix monorepo sub-package, not spam or malware. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.12 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.11 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.10 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.9 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.8 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.7 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.6 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.5 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 0.0.0 | 1 / 4 |
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.