@wovin/storage-fs
Local filesystem storage backend for wovin using LMDB (Lightning Memory-Mapped Database).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all versions of this package; publisher has clean track record. | ai | |
| license | copyleft-license:AGPL-3.0-or-later | AI (license): Package is intentionally AGPL-3.0-or-later licensed; stable across all versions. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped package under @wovin org with 52 versions and active development; poor metadata hygiene, not spam/malware. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:lmdb | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; lmdb referenced in build config, not directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ipld/car | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; @ipld/car referenced in build config, not directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:besonders-logger | AI (phantom-deps): Monorepo package; besonders-logger referenced in build config, not directly imported in source. | ai |
Versions (showing 38 of 38)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.6 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.5 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.2.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.36 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.30 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.23 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.22 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.21 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.20 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.19 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.17 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.15 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.13 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.11 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.9 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.8 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.7 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.5 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.4 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.0.26 | 5 / 6 | |
| 0.0.25 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.24 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.23 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.21 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.20 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.19 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.18 | 5 / 5 | |
| 0.0.17 | 5 / 5 |
v0.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.21
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitLab CI/CD) than the most recent previously approved version (tennox) on 2026-02-13, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.