@wp-playground/components
A library of reusable, dependency-free components (well, React is a dependency) that can be reused between Playground webapp, WordPress plugins, WordPress blocks, and the Blueprints builder. For example, the PathMappingControl will make a good fit for all
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing for WordPress org project; backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are consistent with a WordPress org team expansion; no malicious indicators present. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 69)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1.36 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.35 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.34 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.33 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.32 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.31 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.30 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.29 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.28 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.27 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.26 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.25 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.22 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.21 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.20 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.19 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.18 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.17 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.16 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.15 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.14 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.13 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.12 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.11 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.10 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.9 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.54 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.53 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.52 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.51 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.46 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.45 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.44 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.43 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.42 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.41 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.40 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.39 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.38 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.37 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.36 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.35 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.34 | 0 / 0 | |
| 3.0.33 | 0 / 0 |
v3.1.36
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.35
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.34
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.33
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.32
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.31
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.30
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.29
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.28
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.27
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.26
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.25
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.22
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.20
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.19
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.18
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.17
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.16
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.15
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.54
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.53
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.52
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.51
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.45
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.44
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.42
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.41
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.40
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.39
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.38
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.37
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.36
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.35
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.34
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.33
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.