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@wp-playground/components

A library of reusable, dependency-free components (well, React is a dependency) that can be reused between Playground webapp, WordPress plugins, WordPress blocks, and the Blueprints builder. For example, the PathMappingControl will make a good fit for all

69
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

bgrgicakadamzielbrandonpayton-a8csejasdanielbachhuberyannickdecatjanjakesakirk

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing for WordPress org project; backed by SLSA provenance attestation. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are consistent with a WordPress org team expansion; no malicious indicators present. ai

Versions (showing 69 of 69)

Version Deps Published
3.1.36 0 / 0
3.1.35 0 / 0
3.1.34 0 / 0
3.1.33 0 / 0
3.1.32 0 / 0
3.1.31 0 / 0
3.1.30 0 / 0
3.1.29 0 / 0
3.1.28 0 / 0
3.1.27 0 / 0
3.1.26 0 / 0
3.1.25 0 / 0
3.1.22 0 / 0
3.1.21 0 / 0
3.1.20 0 / 0
3.1.19 0 / 0
3.1.18 0 / 0
3.1.17 0 / 0
3.1.16 0 / 0
3.1.15 0 / 0
3.1.14 0 / 0
3.1.13 0 / 0
3.1.12 0 / 0
3.1.11 0 / 0
3.1.10 0 / 0
3.1.9 0 / 0
3.1.8 0 / 0
3.1.5 0 / 0
3.1.4 0 / 0
3.1.3 0 / 0
3.1.2 0 / 0
3.1.1 0 / 0
3.1.0 0 / 0
3.0.54 0 / 0
3.0.53 0 / 0
3.0.52 0 / 0
3.0.51 0 / 0
3.0.46 0 / 0
3.0.45 0 / 0
3.0.44 0 / 0
3.0.43 0 / 0
3.0.42 0 / 0
3.0.41 0 / 0
3.0.40 0 / 0
3.0.39 0 / 0
3.0.38 0 / 0
3.0.37 0 / 0
3.0.36 0 / 0
3.0.35 0 / 0
3.0.34 0 / 0
3.0.33 0 / 0
3.0.32 0 / 0
3.0.22 0 / 0
3.0.21 0 / 0
3.0.20 0 / 0
3.0.19 0 / 0
3.0.18 0 / 0
3.0.17 0 / 0
3.0.15 0 / 0
3.0.14 0 / 0
3.0.13 0 / 0
3.0.12 0 / 0
3.0.8 0 / 0
3.0.6 0 / 0
3.0.5 0 / 0
3.0.4 0 / 0
3.0.3 0 / 0
3.0.2 0 / 0
3.0.1 0 / 0

v3.1.36

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.35

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.34

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.33

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.32

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.31

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.30

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.29

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.28

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.27

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.26

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.25

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.22

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.20

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.19

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.18

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.17

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.16

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.15

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.14

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.12

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.11

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.10

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.9

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.8

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-10) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.5

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-04) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-02) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.54

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.53

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-16) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.52

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.51

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.46

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.45

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.44

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-20) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.42

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.41

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-14) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.40

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.39

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-07) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.38

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.37

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.36

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2026-01-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.35

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-29) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.34

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.33

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.32

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: adamziel → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.0.22

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.21

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.20

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.19

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.18

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.17

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.15

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.14

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.13

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.12

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.8

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.