@xpla/web-extension-interface
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Legitimate ecosystem interface package; sparse README is typical for interface/type-definition packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common; package age and version history establish legitimacy. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.7.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.7.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.5.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 1.5.1 | 2 / 0 |
v1.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.