@xwiki/cristal-collaboration-xwiki
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): XWiki org monorepo package; provenance not yet configured but package is clearly legitimate. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.25.0 | 6 / 6 | |
| 0.24.0 | 6 / 6 |
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.