@xwiki/cristal-hierarchy-api
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@xwiki/cristal-api | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org monorepo dep; declared as peer/runtime dependency, not necessarily directly imported in this sub-package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.1.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.25.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.24.0 | 2 / 3 |
v1.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.24.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.