@xwiki/platform-livedata-xwiki
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): michael.hamann and vmassol are known XWiki contributors; transition consistent with org-level maintainer rotation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vmassol is a well-known XWiki community member; addition consistent with legitimate org maintainer management. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 18.4.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 18.3.0 | 2 / 15 | |
| 18.2.1 | 1 / 13 | |
| 18.2.0 | 1 / 13 |
v18.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (surli) than the most recent previously approved version (manuelleduc) on 2026-05-27, but surli is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v18.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v18.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.