@xwiki/platform-tool-eslintconfig
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): XWiki org package; missing description is cosmetic, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): XWiki org has not adopted Sigstore provenance; consistent across their packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 18.4.0 | 11 / 4 | |
| 18.3.0 | 11 / 4 | |
| 18.2.0 | 11 / 4 | |
| 18.1.0 | 11 / 2 |
v18.4.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (surli) than the most recent previously approved version (manuelleduc) on 2026-05-27, but surli is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v18.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v18.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.