@xylabs/creatable
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): Documented deprecation shim migrating to sibling @ariestools/sdk package, not an unvetted dep. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Package intentionally converted to a re-export shim per package.json description/deprecated field. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Trusted publisher with 502 approved packages; likely a CI environment change, not a supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 126)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 8.0.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 8.0.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.2 | 7 / 12 | |
| 7.0.1 | 7 / 12 | |
| 7.0.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 6.1.4 | 7 / 12 | |
| 6.1.3 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.1.1 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.1.0 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.10 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.9 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.8 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.7 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.6 | 7 / 11 | |
| 6.0.5 | 7 / 11 | |
| 6.0.4 | 7 / 11 | |
| 6.0.3 | 7 / 11 | |
| 6.0.2 | 7 / 11 | |
| 6.0.1 | 7 / 10 | |
| 6.0.0 | 7 / 11 | |
| 5.1.5 | 7 / 11 | |
| 5.1.4 | 7 / 11 | |
| 5.1.3 | 7 / 11 | |
| 5.1.2 | 7 / 11 | |
| 5.1.1 | 7 / 10 | |
| 5.1.0 | 7 / 12 | |
| 5.0.102 | 7 / 12 | |
| 5.0.101 | 7 / 12 | |
| 5.0.100 | 7 / 13 | |
| 5.0.99 | 7 / 34 | |
| 5.0.98 | 8 / 10 | |
| 5.0.97 | 8 / 10 | |
| 5.0.96 | 8 / 10 | |
| 5.0.95 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.0.94 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.0.93 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.0.92 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.0.91 | 8 / 8 | |
| 5.0.90 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.89 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.88 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.87 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.86 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.84 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.83 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.82 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.81 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.80 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.79 | 8 / 5 | |
| 5.0.78 | 8 / 5 |
v8.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
3 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): @ariestools/sdk is unvetted and the sole remaining dep after stripping all legitimate xylabs deps; generalizes as a reject signal.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (source-diff): 99% source drop combined with redirect to unvetted dep is a strong malicious-shim indicator for this package.) Total source code size decreased by 99%. Could indicate code was replaced with a minimal stub/redirect.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
3 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): @ariestools/sdk is unvetted and the sole remaining dep after stripping all legitimate xylabs deps; generalizes as a reject signal.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (source-diff): 99% source drop combined with redirect to unvetted dep is a strong malicious-shim indicator for this package.) Total source code size decreased by 99%. Could indicate code was replaced with a minimal stub/redirect.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-04, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.102
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-04, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.101
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.100
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.99
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.98
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.97
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.96
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.95
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.94
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
v5.0.93
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
v5.0.92
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
v5.0.91
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
v5.0.90
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
v5.0.89
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.88
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.87
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.86
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.84
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.83
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.82
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.81
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.