@xylabs/delay
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainer atrouw matched to known maintainer email on prior versions. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Org account rotation, not a takeover; corroborated by provenance INFO note. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Manual publish by known maintainer, no deps/scripts changed. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): New dep is the package's own documented successor per deprecation notice, not an unvetted third party. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): High-volume publisher (261 approved) with clean track record; dormancy pattern not indicative of takeover here. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established XY Labs package; lack of provenance is consistent across their entire SDK monorepo. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 131)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.2 | 1 / 10 | |
| 8.0.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 8.0.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.8 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.7 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.6 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.5 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.4 | 1 / 10 | |
| 7.0.2 | 1 / 8 | |
| 7.0.1 | 1 / 8 | |
| 7.0.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 6.1.4 | 1 / 8 | |
| 6.1.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.1.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.1.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.10 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.9 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.8 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.7 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.6 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 6.0.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.5 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 5.1.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 5.0.102 | 1 / 8 | |
| 5.0.101 | 1 / 8 | |
| 5.0.100 | 1 / 8 | |
| 5.0.99 | 1 / 30 | |
| 5.0.98 | 1 / 7 | |
| 5.0.97 | 1 / 7 | |
| 5.0.96 | 1 / 7 | |
| 5.0.95 | 1 / 8 | |
| 5.0.94 | 1 / 9 | |
| 5.0.93 | 1 / 9 | |
| 5.0.92 | 1 / 9 | |
| 5.0.91 | 1 / 7 | |
| 5.0.90 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.89 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.88 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.87 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.86 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.84 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.83 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.82 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.81 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.80 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.79 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.78 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.76 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.75 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.74 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.73 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.72 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.71 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.70 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.69 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.67 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.66 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.65 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.64 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.63 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.62 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.61 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.60 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.59 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.58 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.57 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.56 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.55 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.54 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.52 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.51 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.50 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.49 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.48 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.47 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.46 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.45 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.44 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.43 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.42 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.41 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.40 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.39 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.38 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.37 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.36 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.35 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.34 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.33 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.32 | 1 / 4 | |
| 5.0.31 | 1 / 4 |
v8.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.8
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.7
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.6
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.5
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.4
2 findings[Reject — re-review on republish] (prior reject: AI (publish-pattern): Swap of trusted dep for unvetted @ariestools/sdk is the canonical supply-chain pivot pattern.) This version introduces 1 new runtime dependency(ies) compared to the last vetted version. New dependencies on established packages warrant extra scrutiny — this was the axios attack vector (adding plain-crypto-js).
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-19, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.5
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.4
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.1.3
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-14, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.2
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-07, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-05, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-04, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.102
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: atrouw.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (atrouw) than the most recent previously approved version (xyo) on 2026-05-04, but atrouw is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on email). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.101
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.100
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.99
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.98
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.97
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.96
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.95
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.94
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.93
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.92
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.91
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.90
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: xyo.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.89
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.88
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.87
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.86
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.84
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.83
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.82
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.81
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.80
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.79
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.78
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.76
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.75
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.74
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.73
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.72
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.71
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.70
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.69
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.67
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.66
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.65
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.64
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.58
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.56
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.55
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.54
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.52
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.51
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.50
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.49
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.48
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.33
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.0.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.