@xyo-network/chain-services
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@xyo-network/chain-modules | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; consistent with the package's established publishing pattern. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): High-volume xyo publisher with strong track record; likely CI environment change, not a supply chain indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established xyo-network monorepo; provenance not used across the ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 106)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.8 | 34 / 13 | |
| 1.4.6 | 33 / 13 | |
| 1.3.30 | 32 / 13 | |
| 1.3.27 | 32 / 14 | |
| 1.3.25 | 32 / 14 | |
| 1.3.24 | 31 / 14 |
v1.4.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.4.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.