@xyo-network/react-chain-blockchain
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@xyo-network/react-chain-shared | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo dependency; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 106)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.29 | 41 / 15 | |
| 1.3.28 | 41 / 15 | |
| 1.3.27 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.3.26 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.3.25 | 36 / 21 | |
| 1.3.24 | 34 / 21 |
v1.3.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.