@yarn-tool/publish-retry
```bash yarn add @yarn-tool/publish-retry yarn-tool add @yarn-tool/publish-retry yt add @yarn-tool/publish-retry ```
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established publisher with long track record; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.0.9 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.0.8 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.0.7 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.0.5 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.0.4 | 5 / 0 | |
| 2.0.3 | 5 / 0 |
v2.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.