@yarnpkg/plugin-compat
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Brotli-compressed fsevents patch blob; documented pattern in yarnpkg/berry across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.13 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.12 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.11 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.10 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.9 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.8 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.7 | 1 / 10 | |
| 4.0.6 | 1 / 10 |
v4.0.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.