@yyc3/i18n-core
π YYCΒ³ Production-Ready Internationalization (i18n) Framework - High-performance, plugin-based, zero-dependency i18n solution for TypeScript/JavaScript applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source β the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:yyc3.dev | AI (email-domain): SLSA provenance attestation provides strong identity assurance; domain risk is mitigated for this publisher. | ai |
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yyc3.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'yyc3.dev' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.