@zcomponent/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @zcomponent/core from Zappar Limited; not a typosquat of cors — different namespace, purpose, and long history. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Proprietary commercial SDK; missing public repo/README detail is expected for closed-source packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.29.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.28.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.27.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.27.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.27.0 | 0 / 2 |
v1.28.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.27.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.27.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.27.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.