@zcomponent/three
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): simon_zappar matches the Zappar Limited author; organizational maintainer addition, not a hostile takeover. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Proprietary internal package for Mattercraft; missing public repo/keywords is expected for this type of package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.38.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.37.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.36.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.35.1 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.35.0 | 1 / 1 | |
| 1.34.0 | 1 / 1 |
v1.37.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.36.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.35.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.35.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.34.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.