@zed-industries/agent-client-protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | source-size-dropped | AI (source-diff): Size drop reflects scoped `files` field shipping only dist/typescript artifacts, not full monorepo. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA attestation is a legitimate automation upgrade for zed-industries. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): benbrandt is a known Zed Industries contributor; addition aligns with org-level CI publishing setup. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:typescript/docs/assets/search.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 content is TypeDoc-generated window.searchData; benign documentation artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:typescript/docs/assets/hierarchy.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 content is TypeDoc-generated window.hierarchyData; benign documentation artifact. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:typescript/docs/assets/icons.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated SVG icon sprite; minified docs asset, not executable attack surface. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:typescript/docs/assets/search.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated search index; base64-encoded search data is expected for this tool. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:typescript/docs/assets/main.js | AI (source-diff): TypeDoc-generated bundled docs JS; standard minified output from typedoc build. | ai |
Versions (showing 17 of 17)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.4.5 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.4.4 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.4.3 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.4.2 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.4.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.4.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.2.3 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.0.34 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.0.33 | 1 / 11 | |
| 0.0.32 | 1 / 10 |
v0.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
3 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
5 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.34
2 findingsModified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.