@zendesk/zcli-apps
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:axios | AI (phantom-deps): axios is a declared runtime dep used indirectly via internal modules; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a known implicit TypeScript runtime dep; stable false positive. | ai |
v1.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zd-svc-npmjs) than the most recent previously approved version (massaki) on 2026-06-04, but zd-svc-npmjs is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.