@zendesk/zcli-connectors
zcli connectors commands live here
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:axios | AI (phantom-deps): Used in build/config context; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): Known implicit TypeScript runtime dependency; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:rimraf | AI (phantom-deps): Used in postpack script; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:adm-zip | AI (phantom-deps): Used in build/config context; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.4 | 13 / 15 | |
| 1.1.2 | 13 / 16 | |
| 1.1.1 | 13 / 16 | |
| 1.1.0 | 13 / 16 | |
| 1.0.1 | 13 / 16 | |
| 1.0.0 | 13 / 16 |
v1.1.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zd-svc-npmjs) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.