@zendesk/zcli-core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): akash.lahane added as part of Zendesk org account migration; publisher is a known maintainer. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): rishikesh.sonawane removed as part of same org migration; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Lazy-load of optional native keytar module; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:keytar | AI (phantom-deps): keytar is an optionalDependency loaded via dynamic require; not a direct import by design. | ai |
v1.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zd-svc-npmjs) than the most recent previously approved version (massaki) on 2026-06-04, but zd-svc-npmjs is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.