@zendesk/zcli-core
3
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
SLSA provenance attestation
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Maintainers
zdrsimzd-svc-npmjsakash.lahanesavya.singhraj.hawaldarneeraj.gupta-zendesk
Keywords
zclizendeskcommandcli
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): akash.lahane added as part of Zendesk org account migration; publisher is a known maintainer. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): rishikesh.sonawane removed as part of same org migration; no malicious indicators. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Lazy-load of optional native keytar module; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:keytar | AI (phantom-deps): keytar is an optionalDependency loaded via dynamic require; not a direct import by design. | ai |
v1.1.4
2 findings
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
INFO
Publisher changed: zd-svc-npmjs → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-20, now via trusted publisher with provenance)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (zd-svc-npmjs) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.