@zendesk/zcli-themes
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/ws | AI (phantom-deps): @types packages are type-only and conventionally listed as deps in TS projects; not a real phantom dep. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/inquirer | AI (phantom-deps): Same as @types/ws — type-only package, stable false positive for this TS project. | ai |
v1.1.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zd-svc-npmjs) than the most recent previously approved version (massaki) on 2026-06-04, but zd-svc-npmjs is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.