@zenithbuild/cli
Deterministic project orchestrator for Zenith framework
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@zenithbuild/compiler | AI (dependencies): Same-org monorepo sibling dependency; expected pattern for @zenithbuild/* packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): Scoped org package @zenithbuild/cli; Levenshtein match to 'joi' is a false positive with no brand impersonation intent. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@zenithbuild/bundler | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@zenithbuild/compiler | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package in a monorepo; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.11 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.7.10 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.7.9 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.7.7 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.7.5 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.7.4 | 4 / 5 | |
| 0.6.5 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.6.4 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.6.3 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.6.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 3 | |
| 0.4.2 | 3 / 1 |
v0.7.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.