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@zenithbuild/compiler-linux-x64

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Internal linux-x64 native binary for @zenithbuild/compiler

15
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

judahsullivan

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with CI/CD automation and backed by SLSA provenance attestation. ai
npm-metadata bundled-binaries AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native binary sub-package; bundled binary is the intended artifact, backed by SLSA provenance. ai
bogus-package bogus-package AI (bogus-package): Sparse metadata is expected for a platform-specific binary shim with no JS deps or API surface. ai

Versions (showing 15 of 15)

Version Deps Published
0.7.11 0 / 0
0.7.10 0 / 0
0.7.9 0 / 0
0.7.7 0 / 0
0.7.5 0 / 0
0.7.4 0 / 0
0.7.3 0 / 0
0.7.2 0 / 0
0.7.1 0 / 0
0.7.0 0 / 0
0.6.17 0 / 0
0.6.13 0 / 0
0.6.12 0 / 0
0.6.11 0 / 0
0.6.10 0 / 0

v0.7.11

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.9

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.7

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.5

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.4

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-25) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-24) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-22) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.7.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-21) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.17

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-06) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.13

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: judahsullivan → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-05) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.6.12

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.11

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.6.10

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.