@zeropress/build-core
Shared ZeroPress build core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:markdown-it | AI (dependencies): markdown-it is a well-established, widely-used Markdown parser; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.1 | 7 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.1.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.7.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (laelbe) on 2026-07-22, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.