@zhivex-ai/anthropic
Anthropic adapter for Zhivex AI SDK.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.6.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.6.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mortiz.zhivex) on 2026-07-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.6.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.