← Home

@zhivex-ai/openai

npm Repository Homepage

OpenAI adapter for Zhivex AI SDK.

22
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

mortiz.zhivex

Keywords

aisdkopenaillmtypescript

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): Common for new packages; no other risk signals present to elevate this. ai

Versions (showing 22 of 22)

Version Deps Published
0.9.2 2 / 0
0.9.1 2 / 0
0.9.0 2 / 0
0.8.1 2 / 0
0.8.0 2 / 0
0.7.2 2 / 0
0.7.1 2 / 0
0.7.0 2 / 0
0.6.3 2 / 0
0.6.2 2 / 0
0.6.1 2 / 0
0.6.0 2 / 0
0.5.2 2 / 0
0.5.1 2 / 0
0.5.0 2 / 0
0.4.1 2 / 0
0.4.0 2 / 0
0.3.0 2 / 0
0.2.0 2 / 0
0.1.3 2 / 0
0.1.2 2 / 0
0.1.0 1 / 0

v0.9.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v0.9.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: mortiz.zhivex → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-24, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mortiz.zhivex) on 2026-07-24, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.9.0

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: mortiz.zhivex → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-19, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (mortiz.zhivex) on 2026-07-19, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.8.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.8.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.7.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.