@zipbul/baker
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-gcptd79v.js | AI (source-diff): Bun bundler output (// @bun header, readable minified ESM); not obfuscated, stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-3gcf6hkv.js | AI (source-diff): Bun bundler output (// @bun header); minified ESM split chunk, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-wy5sh2nx.js | AI (source-diff): Bun bundler output (// @bun header); minified ESM split chunk, not obfuscated malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-jzjz61tg.js | AI (source-diff): Standard Bun bundler output with linked sourcemap; not obfuscated, just minified ESM. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from personal account to GitHub Actions CI/CD is expected and backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.4.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.3.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.3.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.2.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.1.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 21 | |
| 2.2.0 | 1 / 16 | |
| 2.1.0 | 1 / 16 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 14 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.1.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.1.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.1.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.0.1 | 1 / 5 |
v3.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.