@zipbul/core
DI container, application bootstrap and module system for Zipbul
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/src/cluster/application-worker.js | AI (source-diff): Bun-bundled ESM output with --minify-syntax --minify-whitespace; long lines are minified app logic, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:dotenv | AI (phantom-deps): dotenv is a declared dependency used via config files; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @zipbul/core in its own org; not impersonating cors. Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@zipbul/baker | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@zipbul/logger | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:exponential-backoff | AI (phantom-deps): Referenced in config files per finding; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.2.0 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.3 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.2 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.1 | 5 / 2 | |
| 0.1.0 | 5 / 2 |
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage name '@zipbul/core' is 1 edit(s) away from popular package 'cors'.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.