@zmeel/db
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:pg | AI (typosquat): Scoped @zmeel org package; not impersonating pg, it's a DB utility wrapper. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:qs | AI (typosquat): Scoped @zmeel org package; no relation to qs, levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@zmeel/shared | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package; phantom-dep heuristic doesn't apply to monorepo shared deps. | ai |
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.