allure-codeceptjs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Published via GitHub Actions from official allure-framework org; provenance absence is common for this ecosystem. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:allure-js-commons | AI (dependencies): allure-js-commons is a sibling package in the same allure-js monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7.1 | 2 / 20 | |
| 3.4.3 | 2 / 31 | |
| 3.4.2 | 2 / 31 | |
| 3.4.1 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.4.0 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.3.3 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.3.2 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 30 | |
| 3.2.2 | 2 / 30 | |
| 2.15.1 | 1 / 21 |
v3.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.15.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.